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We show how the initial subnational entry location of foreign multinational
enterprises (MNEs) in China influences their subsequent within-country location
choices and expansion speed. We distinguish between MNEs that establish their
first subsidiary in co-ethnic cores – dense agglomerations of other firms from the
same country of origin – and MNEs that locate their first subsidiary in the
periphery, i.e., outside of these co-ethnic cores. To identify co-ethnic cores in
China, we employ a geo-visualizationmethodology, which draws the boundaries
of cores organically and dynamically over time. We contrast our findings with the
prevailing approach of using static administrative boundaries for identifying
agglomerations. Our results provide evidence of path dependency, in that
(a) entry through subnational locations with strong co-ethnic communities is
followed by expansion into other locations where co-ethnic communities are
present, and that (b) entry through co-ethnic communities accelerates thepace at
whichMNEs establish additional subsidiaries in China.We also find that co-ethnic
community effects continue to influencewithin-countryMNE activities over time,
despite a host of economic, institutional, and investment developments.
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INTRODUCTION
There is growing interest among international business (IB) schol-
ars in the characteristics and effects of foreign multinational
enterprise (MNE) agglomerations, including those based on a
shared country of origin (Kim, 2015; Tan & Meyer, 2011; Zhu,
Eden, Miller, Thomas, & Fields, 2012). Although the extant
literature suggests that these types of agglomerations appear
attractive as locations for MNEs’ first entry in a new host country
(Henisz & Delios, 2001; Tan & Meyer, 2011; Zhu et al., 2012), we do
not yet know how these entry locations shape the subsequent
geographic expansion of MNEs within the host country.
MNE agglomeration research can be divided into two streams.1
One stream investigates MNE-to-MNE linkages based on industry- or
activity-based clusters, MNE capabilities, and MNE strategy
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(Beugelsdijk & Mudambi, 2013; Cano-Kollmann,
Cantwell, Hannigan, Mudambi, & Song, 2016; Klier
& McMillen, 2008a, b; Mariotti, Piscitello, & Elia,
2010; Porter, 1998). A second stream investigates co-
ethnic agglomerations – MNEs from a single country
of origin and the co-ethnic communities that can form
within them2 (e.g., Dana, Etemad, & Wright, 2008;
Guille´n, 2002; Head, Ries, & Swenson, 1995; Henisz
& Delios, 2001; Hernandez, 2014; Kim, 2015; Miller,
Thomas, Eden, & Hitt, 2008; Rangan & Sengul, 2009;
Tan & Meyer, 2011). We focus on the latter stream
and answer the question: How does an initial entry
through a co-ethnic community influence MNEs’
subsequent subnational location choices and expan-
sion speed within the same host country? We draw
on the co-ethnicity perspective from economic soci-
ology (Levitt, 2004; Polanyi, Arensberg, & Pearson,
1957; Light, 1972, 1983; Portes & Sensenbrenner,
1993; Rezaei, 2011) and logics from research on the
effects of social and geographic proximity (Boschma,
2005; Tong, 2005). Our research responds to calls for
finer-grained analyses of subnational MNE location-
choice effects with the goal of improving the spec-
ification of IB models (Cantwell & Brannen, 2011;
Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Chan, Makino
& Isobe, 2010; Lorenzen & Mudambi, 2013).
Our study is situated in China because it provides
a natural setting with considerable subnational
heterogeneity, which may influence investments
decisions, and within-country expansion in partic-
ular (e.g., Shi, Sun, Pinkham, & Peng, 2014). More-
over, China continues to be in institutional
transition, creating a need for MNEs entering the
country to cope with substantial uncertainty (Delios
& Henisz, 2003; Morrison, 2014). Countries in
transition exhibit voids in formal market-support-
ing institutions, resulting in the emergence of
informal mechanisms that fill these voids (Kim &
Song, 2016; Peng, 2003; Tong, 2005). In such
environments, relationships are a critical part of
doing business and therefore foreign MNEs may
seek out co-ethnic communities as a strategy to
reduce uncertainty (Hernandez, 2014; Kim, 2015;
Rezaei, 2011; Tan & Meyer, 2011). Co-ethnic com-
munities facilitate market transactions through
non-market mechanisms – for instance, by aiding
business-relationship building and providing access
to a qualified labor pool, which can be particularly
beneficial during the initial entry stage of a foreign
MNE in a new host country (Adler & Cole, 1993;
Ahmadjian, 2016; Florida & Kenney, 1991; Martin,
Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 1995; Portes & Sensen-
brenner, 1993; Womack, Jones, & Roos, 1990).
While the benefits of co-ethnic communities for
foreign MNEs, especially new entrants, have been
discussed, the IB literature has not yet linked entry
through co-ethnic communities to the subsequent
within-country expansion of foreign MNEs. We
regard this as a substantial gap in the literature,
because the first subsidiary of an MNE in a host
country plays an important role in shaping how the
MNE expands in that country (Chang, 1995; Chang
& Rosenzweig, 2001; Gao & Pan, 2010). We begin
to address this gap by demonstrating that an MNE’s
initial location choice in a host country – within or
outside of co-ethnic communities – can have
important consequences for its subsequent
within-country expansion. An MNE that enters a
host country through a location with a strong co-
ethnic community may enjoy sustained benefits
such as easier access to financing, social support for
expatriates and their families, and access to infor-
mation and other resources (Hernandez, 2014;
Jean, Tan, & Sinkovics, 2011; Li, Gwon, & Hernan-
dez, 2015; Miller et al., 2008). This co-ethnic
support may affect the MNE’s subsequent within-
country location choices and expansion speed, i.e.,
the rate at which an MNE establishes additional
subsidiaries in the host country.
We apply geo-visualization techniques (An-
drienko et al., 2010; Pavlovskaya, 2006; Wang,
Zhang, Zhang, & Zhang, 2014) from geographic
information science (GIS) to identify Japanese MNE
agglomerations in China based on a panel of
geocoded subnational investment data. Prior
research has generally used fixed administrative
units (such as provinces and states) to identify
agglomerations of foreign direct investment (FDI).
This approach might not have captured the actual
proximity perimeters of co-ethnic agglomerations.
By defining the boundaries of MNE agglomerations
‘‘organically’’ and over time, rather than based on
fixed, predefined administrative units, we are able
to ‘‘zoom in’’ and provide a much more nuanced
understanding of the within-host-country expan-
sion of foreign MNEs (Morgan, 1998; Waldinger,
Aldrich, & Ward, 1990). We aim to make at least
three theoretical and methodological contributions
to research and practice.
First, we aim to show that co-ethnic communities
represent an important and enduring informal
mechanism for bridging market inefficiencies when
MNEs face significant institutional uncertainty. By
zooming in on co-ethnic agglomerations and their
effects on within-country MNE expansion, we
extend the core–periphery framework (Benito &
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Narula, 2007; Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016; San-
tangelo, 2009; Wallerstein, 1974) and integrate it
with the co-ethnic perspective grounded in eco-
nomic sociology (Levitt, 2004; Portes & Sensen-
brenner, 1993; Rezaei, 2011). Second, we show how
IB research can overcome the need for predefined
administrative units and achieve a much more
accurate definition of subnational core–periphery
regions with the help of geo-visualization method-
ologies. Third, relaxing the assumptions of admin-
istrative boundaries also allows us to look more
deeply into the discontinuities, irregularities, and
heterogeneity of the spatial evolution of MNEs over
time.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Core and Periphery Locations
The core–periphery framework (Benito & Narula,
2007; Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016; Santangelo,
2009; Wallerstein, 1974) divides locations into core
and periphery, based on the extent of their inte-
gration with the world economy (usually opera-
tionalized by the volume or density of FDI activity).
Periphery locations, which receive little FDI relative
to core locations, are characterized by shallow
resource pools and limited economic activity. Nev-
ertheless, the periphery may be attractive to MNEs
because of the availability of valuable basic
resources, such as semi-skilled labor, at a relatively
low cost (Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016; Santan-
gelo, 2009). In addition, governments often pro-
vide subsidies and incentives to attract FDI to
periphery regions (Cheng, 2014).
Core locations, by contrast, provide diverse and
sophisticated resources, attracting large numbers of
foreign MNEs (Benito & Narula, 2007; Goerzen,
Asmussen, & Nielsen, 2013). Repeated interaction
between foreign MNEs and local actors may
improve information about and access to resources
such as labor, infrastructure, and finance (Mariotti
et al., 2010; Mudambi, 2002; Spencer, 2008). Inter-
actions among foreign MNEs in core locations may
also lead to technology and other knowledge
spillovers (Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016; Santan-
gelo, 2009). However, increasing competition
among firms in core locations tends to create
substantial upward pressure on the costs of labor,
land, and other crucial inputs. In the case of China,
significant economic and institutional reforms
have taken place in the period we studied
(1996–2014). One aspect of development has been
government incentives that are explicitly tied to
market-based transactions (Zhou, Li, Zhao, & Cai,
2003) and the geographic push of FDI westward,
into the interior of China and away from the
coastal cities (Shi et al., 2014). Yet the link between
FDI movement and government incentives is ten-
uous – studies show that even with substantial
incentives, the subnational geographic distribution
of FDI is not easily malleable (Cantwell &
Mudambi, 2005; Mudambi, 1998). When inte-
grated with the core–periphery framework, this
suggests that cores in developing markets tend to
have durable, attractive qualities that are difficult
to overcome by economic policy targeted at dis-
tributing FDI more broadly. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, economic sociologists argue that cores tend
to be resilient, making it difficult to dislodge them
once formed (Waldinger, 1995).
Co-ethnic Cores
Foreign MNEs rely on relationships driven by the
individual MNE’s customers, suppliers, and sub-
sidiary networks (Harzing & Sorge, 2003). Some
MNEs seek to replicate relationships from their
country of origin in host countries (Florida &
Kenney, 1991; Head et al., 1995; Martin et al.,
1995). Within individual host countries, subna-
tional locations with large numbers of MNEs from
the same country of origin (co-ethnic agglomera-
tions), coordination between co-ethnic MNEs may
lead to the development of co-ethnic communities
(Hernandez, 2014; Levitt, 2004; Light, 2010; Miller
et al., 2008; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). Rezaei
(2011) described co-ethnic communities as concen-
trated nodes in relatively restricted spatial areas
within global cities, functioning like bazaar-type
economies (Dana et al., 2008) based on social
norms from the country of origin of the respective
co-ethnic community (Shin, Hasse, & Schotter,
2016). However, only agglomerations that main-
tain a sufficient number of co-ethnic MNEs can
develop into co-ethnic communities, because the
local co-ethnic population requires a certain level
of co-ethnic activity to establish co-ethnic schools,
banks, law firms, and other support services (Chang
& Park, 2005; Rezaei, 2011). While observing and
identifying such communities is quite difficult,
they are strongly coupled with the density of co-
ethnic agglomerations (Waldinger, 1995). We thus
extend the core–periphery framework with the
concept of co-ethnic cores – the dense MNE agglom-
erations that are explicitly tied to co-ethnic com-
munities and their related resources.
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Our distinction between core and periphery
along the co-ethnic dimension (Hernandez, 2014;
Li et al., 2015; Kim, 2015; Miller et al., 2008; Rezaei,
2011) goes beyond the traditional operationaliza-
tion of FDI core versus periphery based on admin-
istrative units. The traditional approach, which
identifies cores based on state, province, or city
boundaries with large inward FDI stocks or flows,
treats all points within each administrative area as
equal. Investments inside a ‘‘core’’ administrative
unit are contrasted with investments outside of it
(‘‘periphery’’). We relax this assumption, by parsing
the traditional agglomeration data into much finer-
grained data at the street level, thus distinguishing
between co-ethnic core and periphery within the
administrative units that would previously have
been classified as monolithic cores. This approach
accords with the views of economic sociologists
(Dana et al., 2008; Rezaei, 2011) who argue that
communities occupy small geographic spaces, and
that the true enclave boundaries are more mean-
ingful than official administrative boundaries (Le-
vitt, 2004; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993). The
social effects of these communities are thought to
be tightly coupled with short geographic distances
on the scale of a large city block which facilities
identification-based relationships (Lewicki & Bun-
ker, 1996) underlying social-relations-driven busi-
ness networks (Rezaei, 2011). Thus it is critical for a
co-ethnic MNE to be located within the boundaries
of the co-ethnic core, and not just in the proximate
area defined by a general administrative region.
Co-ethnic cores offer several advantages to MNEs
from the same country of origin. Their shared
cultural background, common social norms, and
social ties facilitate market interaction and infor-
mation sharing (Agrawal, Kapur, & McHale, 2008;
Chang & Park, 2005; Kim, 2015; Li et al., 2015;
Miller et al., 2008; Tan & Meyer, 2011). Moreover,
local actors adapt to the concentration of same-
country MNEs by acquiring language and cultural
knowledge, which reduces the liability of foreign-
ness faced by MNEs from that particular country of
origin (Manning, Sydow, & Windeler, 2012; Miller
et al., 2008; Tan & Meyer, 2011; Zaheer, 1995).
These effects are particularly important for transi-
tion economies, where co-ethnic cores help reduce
institutional uncertainty, provide information, and
facilitate access to support structures such as legal
services and financing (Ahmadjian, 2016; Fiske,
2004; Florida & Kenney, 1991; Tan & Meyer, 2011,
Miller et al., 2008).
While this study examines the role of co-ethnic
cores on Japanese FDI in an emerging market –
China – co-ethnic communities are a more general
phenomenon which also plays an important role in
developed markets, such as the United States, and
which is therefore not restricted to collectivist home
countries like Japan (Hernandez, 2014; Miller et al.,
2008; Zhu et al., 2012). For instance, co-ethnic co-
location and community effects with respect to FDI
have been reported for Korean firms (Chang & Park,
2005; Guille´n, 2002; Li et al., 2015), East Asian and
Southeast Asian banks (Zhu et al., 2012), North
American, European and Asian firms investing in
Vietnam (Tan & Meyer, 2011), and European and
Japanese firms investing in the United States
(Bobonis & Shatz, 2007). Moreover, Hernandez
(2014) linked co-ethnic immigrant populations to
FDI location choice and subsidiary survival, using a
sample of MNEs from 27 different home countries
investing in the United States. Manning et al.
(2012) also showed that German MNEs cooperate
with each other and with the German Chamber of
Commerce to form ‘‘national enclaves’’ (p. 1215) in
a host country, where local labor markets, infras-
tructure, and institutions are then adapted to cater
to the needs of German firms. Co-ethnic ties have
further been shown to increase knowledge flows
among inventors belonging to the Indian diaspora
(Agrawal et al., 2008), and to improve the likelihood
of survival of Gujarati-owned hotels in the United
States (Kalnins & Chung, 2006).
A rich literature also exists that documents co-
ethnic communities at the level of individual
immigrants and expatriates, which are often con-
centrated in ethnic enclaves within larger cities
(Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Waldinger et al.,
1990). Co-ethnic agglomeration of foreigners in
China can be traced back, at least, to the foreign
communities that developed in the semi-colonial
treaty ports of the nineteenth century (Bickers,
1998; Ma, 2008; Ristaino, 2003). In the context of
modern China, scholars have studied co-ethnic
communities in several cities, including African
traders in Guangzhou (Zhang, 2008), Koreans in
Yanji (Kim, 2003), and broader groups of foreign
expatriates in Shanghai and Beijing (e.g., Wang &
Lau, 2008; Wu & Webber, 2004).
The Effect of Co-ethnic Cores on Subsequent
Subsidiary Location
Given the advantages offered by co-ethnic cores,
these cores should be highly attractive for MNEs
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entering a host country for the first time. Yet what is
not clear in the literature is whether the subnational
location of an MNE’s first entry – i.e., within a co-
ethnic core or not – affects the MNE’s subsequent
investments in the host country. Because many
MNEs treat their first subsidiary in a host country as
a platform for expansion (Chang, 1995; Gao & Pan,
2010; Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001; Kogut & Chang,
1996), the subnational entry location of an MNE
may have important implications for its subsequent
within-country expansion, including subnational
location choices and the speed of expansion. While
expansion in the host country can take many forms,
we specifically refer to expansion in the sense of
MNEs establishing additional, new subsidiaries in
other subnational locations. Notably, we do not
consider the expansion of existing facilities or
repeated investments in the same city. While such
repeat investments in a single location are an
important type of within-country expansion, they
are conceptually distinct from MNE expansion to
other subnational locations. Specifically, repeat
investments allow MNEs to draw on their own
location-specific experience (Mudambi, 1998),
which likely reduces the importance of co-ethnic
effects. Given our theoretical framing, we thus focus
on expansion to new subnational locations and
exclude repeat investments.
We expect that the initial entry choice will lead
to a preference for similar locations in the case of
expansion. MNEs that enter a host country through
the periphery must, by necessity, forge close ties
with local actors in order to access local resources
(Waldinger, 1995). These firms might be able to
more easily expand into other periphery locations
because they have developed stronger capabilities
for building local ties, compared to MNEs that
started in co-ethnic cores (Luo, 2002).
On the other hand, MNEs that initially entered
the host country through a co-ethnic core benefit
from the information and resource advantages
associated with these locations. When such an
MNE seeks to expand its presence in the host
country, it may therefore leverage co-ethnic advan-
tages for establishing additional subsidiaries (Luo,
2002; Tan & Tan, 2005). In addition, prior research
suggests that market information in co-ethnic cores
tends to flow easily among co-located MNEs (Her-
nandez, 2014; Kim, 2015; Tan & Meyer, 2011),
making it relatively easier to expand from one co-
ethnic core to another, instead of venturing into the
periphery (Polanyi et al., 1957; Portes & Sensen-
brenner, 1993; Waldinger, 1995). For example, a
Japanese MNE in Dalian might obtain valuable
information from other Japanese firms in Dalian
about opportunities in another Japanese co-ethnic
core, such as Suzhou. It is less likely to obtain
information about opportunities in periphery loca-
tions, because few Japanese firms operate there. As a
result, we expect a co-ethnic core-to-core invest-
ment path dependency (David, 1985) to develop,
such that MNEs entering the host country through
a co-ethnic core are likely to also undertake subse-
quent investments in other core locations.
This tendency for core-to-core expansion patterns
may, in some cases, be mitigated by a redundancy
of information. Some MNEs might find it sufficient
to establish a presence in one core, which allows
them to tap into co-ethnic networks in the host
country. With the initial core foothold in place, co-
ethnic cores may be less attractive for subsequent
investments because information and other co-
ethnic community benefits are similar across cores,
and therefore redundant (Shi et al., 2014). Thus
there may be an incentive for MNEs that start in
cores to move into the periphery after their initial
entry. However, we expect that for most MNEs
entering through co-ethnic cores, the relative ease
of entering other co-ethnic cores will lead to a
pattern of core-to-core expansion. Therefore:
Hypothesis 1: Entering the host country
through a co-ethnic core increases the likelihood
that an MNE will establish subsequent sub-
sidiaries in other co-ethnic cores, rather than in
the periphery.
The Effect of Co-ethnic Cores on the Speed
of Within-country Expansion
The initial entry location in a host country may
also influence an MNE’s within-country expansion
speed, i.e., the rate at which an MNE establishes
additional subsidiaries in the host country. If the
average Japanese MNE expands at a particular rate,
some Japanese MNEs will delay and others will
accelerate their within-country expansion. Some of
the variation in expansion speed may be attributed
to the subnational location of an MNE’s first
subsidiary in either a co-ethnic core or in the
periphery.
MNEs that enter via co-ethnic cores can leverage
co-ethnic ties from their original entry location
in order to expand their presence in the host
country. The co-ethnic community may provide
quicker and more trustworthy information on
market opportunities, potential partners, and other
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resources facilitating expansion (Ahmadjian,
2016; Miller et al., 2008; Portes & Sensenbrenner,
1993; Waldinger, 1995). The information sharing
and trust-based relationships between co-ethnic
MNEs (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Tan & Meyer,
2011) can be a particular advantage in transition
economies, where formal market-supporting insti-
tutions are imperfectly developed (Luo, 2002;
Peng, 2003; Tan & Meyer, 2011). A presence in a
co-ethnic core, characterized by economic and
social networks, may also allow an MNE to
dispatch more easily the expatriate managers
needed to support the firm’s expansion in the
host country (Tan & Mahoney, 2006). An MNE
that enters the host country through the periphery
may still access these co-ethnic benefits later, by
establishing its second or third subsidiary in a co-
ethnic core. However, entering directly through a
co-ethnic core ensures that co-ethnic support is
available from the start, which should accelerate
within-country expansion relative to MNEs that
only enter cores later.
By contrast, entry into the periphery may delay
the expansion of MNEs. Without a substantial co-
ethnic support network, foreign MNEs may expe-
rience greater difficulties in overcoming the lia-
bility of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) and in
accessing critical resources (Hernandez, 2014;
Tan & Meyer, 2011), which will then affect the
speed of within-country expansion. One reason is
that building local embeddedness to access local
resources tends to be time-consuming, especially
for new entrants, who face a high degree of
outsidership and often struggle to gain the trust
of local actors due to limited host-country knowl-
edge (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Tan & Meyer,
2011; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Zaheer,
1995). This may reduce the capacity of new
entrants to undertake within-country expansions
early on. In addition, local embeddedness tends to
be specific to each subnational location (Chang &
Xu, 2008; Meyer, Mudambi, & Narula, 2011),
whereas co-ethnic networks link co-ethnic com-
munities in different parts of the host country
(Rezaei, 2011), which should facilitate expansion
beyond the initial location. Therefore we expect
that on average,3 initial entry through a co-ethnic
core will accelerate an MNE’s within-country
expansion compared to an initial entry through
the periphery. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: Initial entry into a co-ethnic core
will accelerate within-country expansion.
METHODS
Data
We tested our hypotheses using data on Japanese
FDI in China between 1996 and 2014. We drew on
the Toyo Keizai Inc. dataset (2014 edition), which
contains extensive and reliable information on the
overseas investments of Japanese firms (Arregle,
Miller, Hitt, & Beamish, 2013), along with the
China City Statistical Yearbooks (All China Data
Center, 2016), which provide city-level informa-
tion on inward FDI flows from all FDI source
countries. This empirical setting is especially suit-
able for testing our hypotheses because China is a
major recipient of FDI and exhibits significant
subnational variation in its economic and institu-
tional development. Moreover, China’s relatively
recent opening to foreign investment (which coin-
cides roughly with the beginning of our sample
period) and the subsequent surge in inward FDI
make the country a dynamic research setting that
allows us to observe the development of cores and
peripheries over time. After accounting for missing
data, our analytical sample consisted of 2,536
Japanese MNEs. Our analysis focused on mainland
China and excluded the special administrative
regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
Defining Core and Periphery with
Geo-visualization
We began by mapping the subnational distribution
of FDI inflows in China based on administrative
boundaries, in order to show how traditional
approaches would define FDI core and periphery
locations. Drawing on the China City Statistical
Yearbook data, we mapped the entire inward FDI
from all foreign source countries. Specifically, we
mapped the annual number of newly signed FDI
contracts. We used sub-provincial administrative
units, such as prefecture-level cities4 and sub-provin-
cial municipalities, as geographic units for mapping
inward FDI. This is illustrated by the grey-shaded
areas in Figures 1a, b and 2, with darker shading
indicating more FDI inflows. The maps show that
FDI is highly concentrated in a small number of
regions in the coastal provinces, which constitute
the core locations according to this methodology.
cFigure 1 (a) Zoom-out: FDI and co-ethnic cores in China
(1996). (b) Zoom-out: FDI and co-ethnic cores in China
(2014). Note: FDI data (grey) represents average annual new
FDI count from all countries
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The main limitation of this approach is the use
of predefined geographic regions for evaluating the
concentration of FDI (Alca´cer & Zhao, 2016). Even
though we used sub-provincial administrative
regions, which are already significantly more fine-
grained than the provincial boundaries used in
most IB studies of China (Bu & Wagner, 2016;
Chan et al., 2010; Li & Park, 2006; Ma, Tong, &
Fitza, 2013; Schotter & Beamish, 2011; Shi et al.,
2014), the fixed boundaries may nevertheless
obscure the underlying core–periphery structure
(Alca´cer & Zhao, 2016). For instance, the true size
of a core may be exaggerated because non-core
locations within the same geographic unit are
erroneously included. Additionally, we may fail
to detect cores that are located in large geographic
units or that straddle administrative boundaries
(Alca´cer & Zhao, 2016). To overcome the limita-
tions of predefined geographic units, we defined
the boundaries of cores ‘‘organically,’’ based on FDI
density (Alca´cer & Zhao, 2016). Specifically, we
identified subnational core and periphery locations
by examining the cumulative stock of Japanese FDI
in each location, which we regard as a measure of
the co-ethnic support networks available to Japa-
nese firms entering those locations. Leveraging
geo-visualization methodology allowed us to inte-
grate data-driven definitions with social theory
(Dana et al., 2008; Rezaei, 2011) through deter-
ministic interpolation, and to create a social-based
system where all points, even in remote areas, have
relationships. This allowed us to determine co-
ethnic cores and peripheries, thus capturing sub-
national differences more accurately (Alca´cer &
Zhao, 2016; Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016). It also
allowed us to track how the boundaries of cores
and peripheries shift over time in response to
sustained FDI inflows.
In order to map the cumulative stock of Japanese
MNE investments in China, we produced heat
maps using kernel density estimation (KDE) (Sil-
verman, 1986), weighted by the average number of
foreign investments prior to the focal year. On heat
maps, investments are represented as surfaces with
high and low values and statistically defined
boundaries. High values are at the locations where
investment activities are dense; low values are at
the locations where activities are sparse. To gener-
ate heat maps, we geocoded our FDI data at the
street level for all available Japanese MNEs in China
from 1991 to 2014, rather than the more restricted
analytical sample (1996–2014) used for hypothesis
testing. In the rare event that street addresses were
unavailable, we incorporated the next-best approx-
imation, such as the district or zip code. Overall, we
geocoded 10,633 subsidiaries.
The visualization itself was designed with Google
Maps Application Programming Interface, D3.js (a
visualization language for web applications), Java-
Script, and jQuery. To render the heat map on
Google Maps and zoom in on FDI ‘‘hotspots,’’ we
converted the heat map to an ASCII grid file and
rendered the grid with Bourke’s contouring algo-
rithm ‘‘CONREC’’ and D3.js (Bourke, 1987). This
conversion allowed us to represent the heat map
layers in scalable vector graphics (SVG) format, a
special type of imagery that can be stretched and
reduced through zooming in and out on Google
Figure 2 Zoom-in: FDI and co-ethnic cores in the Beijing region (2014). Note FDI data (grey) represents average annual new FDI
count from all countries
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Maps. The advantage of SVG imagery for this
research is the ability to select Japanese subsidiaries
associated with co-ethnic cores throughout China.
Although heat maps are traditionally generated for
certain zoom levels because geographic processes
occur at particular scales, we used a single heat map
for all geographic scales. Our rationale was the
following: FDI processes are commonly studied at
the global scale; therefore, the strongest clusters
(cores) have to be identified at the country level,
not at the level of smaller geographic locations.
Thus when we zoom into the city level, hotspots
are still defined relative to all other Japanese MNE
investments, and not relative to spatial patterns at
the city level.
We explored several methods for determining the
cut-off points for subnational cores and the periph-
ery. We found that the agglomeration effects of the
Japanese community are strongly distance-bound,
experiencing significant diminishing returns after
about 15 km from the origin of agglomeration
(Be´ke´s & Harasztosi, 2013). We explored the ranges
between the upper and lower boundaries around
15 km, with two criteria from our theory in mind.
First, co-ethnic MNEs must be reasonably proxi-
mate to form a community (Tan & Meyer, 2011)
and second, there must be a reasonable baseline of
co-ethnic MNEs available to reach a critical mass for
developing a community effect (Portes & Sensen-
brenner, 1993; Waldinger, 1995). We used a series
of clustering exercises to explore co-ethnic MNE
number thresholds, and found natural breaks in
communities between 10 and 35. We then tested
our ranges with geo-visualization sensitivity analy-
ses using confidence-interval mapping (Guo, Gahe-
gan, MacEachren, & Zhou, 2005). We found that
not all co-ethnic investments near agglomerations
could be included in the co-ethnic cores. The cores
exhibited a center with 4 or 5 confidence intervals.
We incorporated only the first confidence interval
in our analyses. One justification for this restricted
definition was to maintain the geographic scope
that we expected for community-based effects from
the co-ethnicity literature (Bitters, 2009). In addi-
tion, when cores were close or proximate (e.g.,
Shanghai and Suzhou), several overlapping co-
ethnic investments were at the edge of confidence
intervals 4 and 5, leading to very large hotspots.
The geo-visual analysis suggested that the most
consistent modeling of co-ethnic cores that resem-
ble communities would be a 15-km radius and a
minimum of 10 co-ethnic MNEs within each core.
Our geo-visualization not only showed clusters
on the maps, but also allowed us to interact with
the data and change the visualization on the maps.
This allowed us to examine individual subsidiaries
in space, examine changes over time, select and
classify subsidiaries, and extract data from the map
for further statistical analysis.5
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable for Hypothesis 1, subsidiary
2 core, indicates whether an MNE’s second sub-
sidiary was located in a core or periphery location.
The variable takes the value 1 if the second
subsidiary was located in a core location and takes
the value 0 otherwise. We tested Hypothesis 2 with
a repeated-hazards event history analysis (EHA)
(Blomkvist, Kappen, & Zander, 2010; Box-Steffens-
meier & Zorn, 2001; Ezell, Land, & Cohen, 2003;
Kappen, 2011), with the event of interest being the
time of establishment of a focal MNE’s second,
third and fourth subsidiaries in China.
Independent Variable
The independent variable for both hypotheses is
subsidiary 1 core, which indicates whether an MNE’s
first entry into China occurred in a co-ethnic core
or in the periphery. Subsidiary 1 core takes the value
1 if the focal MNE entered through a core location
and the value 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
We used a number of control variables to account
for a range of factors potentially affecting the
within-country expansion patterns of MNEs. In
order to account for the institutional and economic
development of the host country over time, we
controlled for the years in which an MNE estab-
lished its first and second subsidiaries in China,
using the variables subsidiary 1 start year and
subsidiary 2 start year. Both time variables were
scaled such that the start of the sample period, i.e.,
the year 1996, corresponded to a value of 0. We also
included interaction terms of these time variables
with the main independent variable, in order to
account for changes over time in the effect of the
independent variable. In the model for Hypothesis
1, we interacted subsidiary 1 core with subsidiary 2
start year, because the strength of the locational
path dependency might depend on when the
second subsidiary was established. In the model
for Hypothesis 2, we interacted subsidiary 1 core
with subsidiary 1 start year, because the accelerating
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effect of a core entry might be contingent on the
time period in which the initial entry occurred.
We also included a dichotomous control variable
for MNEs that established their first Chinese sub-
sidiary within the administrative boundaries of
Shanghai (subsidiary 1 Shanghai). Exploratory anal-
yses indicated that Shanghai attracted far more FDI
than any other city in China (nearly 32% of all
subsidiaries in our sample). Moreover, FDI charac-
teristics in Shanghai were found to differ from other
cities in China in several ways; for example, Shang-
hai-based subsidiaries tended to be smaller and were
less likely to be joint ventures. We thus distin-
guished between MNEs entering China through
Shanghai and those entering through other loca-
tions, in order to ensure that the special character-
istics of Shanghai were not driving our results.
As the industry of a firm can be expected to affect
its location choices and within-country expansion,
we included industry control variables at the par-
ent-firm level (Hypotheses 1 and 2) and the
subsidiary level (Hypothesis 1). Manufacturing
serves as the reference category for both variables,
as it is the largest category in the sample (63% of
MNEs; 59% of subsidiaries). The other categories
are retail, wholesale, and services.
Subnational investment location choices likely
also depend on the investment purpose of a given
subsidiary. For instance, subsidiaries intended to
produce goods for local consumption can be
expected to be located near lucrative domestic
markets, whereas subnational locations with low
labor costs may be more attractive to labor-seeking
and export-oriented subsidiaries. To take into
account such differences in subsidiary objectives,
we included a set of dichotomous variables that
capture the investment purpose for each subsidiary.
The dichotomous purpose variables are: resource
seeking; labor seeking; local government incentives;
construction of international production network; con-
struction of international distribution network; local
market; export to third countries; reverse imports to
Japan; following customers, suppliers, and related firms;
currency & financial hedging; knowledge seeking; R&D;
new business; and regional headquarters. The different
investment purposes are not mutually exclusive in
our dataset, because one subsidiary may serve
multiple purposes simultaneously. Hence the refer-
ence category for each purpose variable is simply
the absence of that particular investment purpose.
Subnational variation in the quality of market-
supporting institutions can impact MNE strategies
(Meyer & Nguyen, 2005; Shi et al., 2014; Zhang,
2013). We controlled for the quality of market-
supporting institutions in the province in which an
MNE’s first subsidiary was located, in order to
distinguish between the effect of the formal insti-
tutional environment and the effect of co-ethnic
communities. To derive our variable marketization
province 1, we used the marketization index pub-
lished by China’s National Economic Research
Institute (Wang, Fan, & Zhu, 2007). Although this
data was only available for the period from 1997 to
2005, the relative ranking of provinces remained
remarkably stable over time, such that the most
marketized provinces in 1997 were also among the
most marketized in 2005. Based on this observation,
we used the mean marketization score from the
available years for our entire sample period
(1996–2013). To test the robustness of this
approach, we re-ran our model using only the
1997–2005 period, for which the marketization
index was available. Our estimated results were
consistent with the full model using the average
value of the marketization index.
We further controlled for differences in firm
resources by introducing the variable MNE size.
This was operationalized as the number of world-
wide foreign subsidiaries controlled by the MNE
(outside of China) in a given year. Moreover, we
accounted for potential experience effects by
including the variable international experience,
which measures the focal MNE’s international
experience (in subsidiary-years) outside of China.
We standardized both variables.
Econometric Approach
To test Hypothesis 1, we used logistic regression
models to predict the location (core vs. periphery)
of MNEs’ second subsidiaries. For analyzing the
speed of MNE expansion beyond their first sub-
sidiary in the host country (Hypothesis 2), we used
repeated-hazards event history analysis (EHA). EHA
methodologies (also known as survival analysis) are
particularly suitable for studying the occurrence
and timing of events when data are right-censored
(Allison, 2014; Park & Ungson, 1997). Our data are
right-censored because by the end of the sample
period many firms in the sample had not yet
expanded beyond one or two subsidiaries in China,
and it was unknown whether and when they would
expand further. Whereas early EHA methodologies
were developed to study duration data related to a
single, non-repeatable event (such as death),
EHA models have since evolved to accommodate
multiple or repeated events (Blomkvist, Kappen, &
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Zander, 2010; Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001;
Ezell et al., 2003; Kappen, 2011). Commonly used
repeated-hazards models include the Andersen–Gill
model (Andersen & Gill, 1982), the Prentice–Wil-
liams–Peterson model (Prentice, Williams, & Peter-
son, 1981), and the Wei–Lin–Weissfeld (WLW)
model (Wei, Lin, & Weissfeld, 1989). Although
there are advantages and drawbacks associated with
each type of model, we adopted the WLW model
for two reasons. First, because it is a stratified
model, the WLW model does not assume the
dependence of subsequent hazards and allows for
hazard functions to differ across events for a focal
MNE (Ezell et al., 2003; Wei et al., 1989). Thus the
model accounts for the possibility that an MNE’s
hazard of establishing its second subsidiary in a
host country might differ from the hazard of the
same MNE establishing a third subsidiary, and
accounts for the possibility that these hazards
might evolve differently over time.
Second, the Prentice–Williams–Peterson model
and Andersen–Gill model are rigidly linear in the
sense that an MNE is only considered ‘‘at risk’’ for
establishing subsidiary k once subsidiary k - 1 has
been established (Ezell et al., 2003; Wei et al.,
1989). By contrast, the WLW model allows for the
MNE to be simultaneously at risk for multiple
subsidiaries (Box-Steffensmeier, & Zorn, 2001; Ezell
et al., 2003). While Prentice–Williams–Peterson
model is more appropriate for settings in which
events are truly sequential (e.g., multiple CEO
successions within the same firm), the WLW model
arguably reflects more accurately the reality of
MNEs, which may simultaneously pursue several
expansion options simultaneously. In testing
Hypothesis 2, we considered the second, third,
and fourth subsidiaries of MNEs in order to assess
within-country expansion. Expansion beyond the
fourth subsidiary was excluded from the analysis
because of the relatively small number of MNEs in
the sample (less than 10%) that had achieved a
footprint of more than four subsidiaries. The WLW
model was implemented in Stata using the stcox
command with stratification by subsidiary number
(i.e., second, third and fourth subsidiaries), and
clustering by MNE (Cleves, 2009).
RESULTS
Geo-visualization Results
Geo-visualization enabled us to identify Japanese
FDI co-ethnic cores and their periphery. At the
beginning of our sample period in 1996, we iden-
tified four Japanese co-ethnic cores, located in
Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and the northeastern
port city of Dalian (see Figure 1a). As more Japanese
investment entered the country, additional loca-
tions attained co-ethnic core status. Most of these
new co-ethnic cores emerged in the vicinity of
existing cores, such as Suzhou (2001) and Wuxi
(2006) near Shanghai. Other new cores appeared in
major cities in coastal provinces, such as Tianjin
(2003), Hangzhou (2004), Qingdao (2004), and
Guangzhou (2006). In some cases, two distinct
Japanese co-ethnic cores emerged within the same
city or administrative unit. For instance, Tianjin
developed two cores: one in downtown Tianjin and
the other in the Tianjin Economic-Technological
Development Area located some 40 km away from
downtown.6 By 2014, we identified 16 distinct
Japanese co-ethnic cores in China located in 11
cities (see Figure 1b and Table 1). Notably, all of
these cores are located in coastal provinces. Thus
despite government incentives intended to attract
foreign MNEs to the interior (Cheng, 2014; Good-
man, 2004), and despite rising labor costs and
intensifying competition in the coastal centers
(Davies, 2013; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012),
investments by Japanese MNEs continue to be
highly concentrated in the coastal provinces, and
more specifically in a small number of co-ethnic
core locations within those coastal provinces.
Two conclusions can be drawn when comparing
the geo-visualization of Japanese FDI to the distri-
bution of general inward FDI (from all countries)
among subnational administrative units. First,
Japanese co-ethnic cores are located within cities
(and provinces) that are among the top destina-
tions for FDI from all countries (Figures 1a, b).
Second, the geo-visualization confirmed that Japa-
nese FDI and the associated co-ethnic communities
are not captured well by administrative boundaries.
Not only do we find substantial FDI-based hetero-
geneity within provinces, but even the finer-
grained sub-provincial administrative divisions
obscure the true core–periphery landscape. We
illustrate this effect by zooming in on the Beijing
region (Figure 2). The grey-shaded areas represent
administrative units, notably the municipalities of
Beijing and Tianjin and the surrounding prefecture-
level cities. Darker shading represents higher levels
of inward FDI (from all source countries; averaged
for the years 2005–2013). The areas in red show the
location of the Japanese co-ethnic cores identified
by the geo-visualization algorithm (as of 2014).
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While the entire administrative region of Beijing is
dark grey, indicating high levels of FDI inflows
(Figure 2, panel a), the Japanese MNE investment is
much more tightly bound (Figure 2, panel b).
Zooming in further, we see that the co-ethnic core
is concentrated within the city center (Figure 2,
panel c). Specifically, the co-ethnic core of Beijing
covers most of the area within the 4th Ring Road,
which surrounds the inner city (marked by the dark
line in Figure 2, panel c), but also extends further to
the north and east, where Beijing Capital Interna-
tional Airport is located. Notably, not all locations
within the municipal limits of Beijing are part of
the co-ethnic core, and less than 60% of the
Japanese subsidiaries in Beijing are located in the
Beijing co-ethnic core. This illustrates how geo-
visualization allows us to ‘‘zoom in’’ further than
most previous studies, and to distinguish between
core and non-core locations even within the same
city. We show below that this increased precision
can make a meaningful difference in empirical
models.
Econometric Results
Table 2 reports the summary statistics and correla-
tions.7 Variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all
variables were below 3.5 for all of our models.
Although the correlation between international expe-
rience and MNE size was relatively high, the VIFs
associated with these variables were below 2, sug-
gesting that multicollinearity was not an issue (Hair,
Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Table 3 presents
the results from the logistic regression used to test
Hypothesis 1, which predicted that entry through a
co-ethnic core increases the likelihood that an MNE
will establish subsequent subsidiaries in co-ethnic
cores, rather than in the periphery.
Model 1 serves as the base model for this
hypothesis, while Model 2 introduces the indepen-
dent variable subsidiary 1 core. In Model 2, the odds
ratio associated with subsidiary 1 core is significantly
greater than one (p\0.05), indicating that the
odds of a second subsidiary being in a co-ethnic
core are higher for MNEs whose first subsidiary was
in a co-ethnic core than for MNEs whose first
subsidiary was in the periphery. Thus Hypothesis 1
is supported. Moreover, there appears to be an
interaction effect between subsidiary 1 core and
subsidiary 2 start year (marginally significant,
p = 0.05). Whereas the statistical significance of
the interaction term does not constitute a valid test
of moderation when evaluating non-linear models
in terms of marginal (probability) effects (Ai &
Norton, 2003; Wiersema & Bowen, 2009), we are
interpreting our model in terms of multiplicative
effects (odds ratios). For multiplicative effects, we
can interpret the interaction terms directly (Buis,
2010). Because of the interaction effect, the main
effect should be interpreted as the impact of
subsidiary 1 core when the interacting variable is
equal to 0 (Buis, 2010; Singer & Willett, 2003). In
this case, a value of 0 for the interacting variable
(subsidiary 2 start year) corresponds to the year
1996. Thus for MNEs that established their second
subsidiary in 1996 and whose first subsidiary was in
a core, the odds of the second subsidiary also being
located in a core are 3.5 times the odds for a
comparable MNE that established its first subsidiary
in the periphery (odds ratio 3.51, p\0.05). For
second subsidiaries established after 1996, the
effect diminishes every year by approximately 7%
(odds ratio 0.93, p = 0.05).
In order to aid interpretation of these findings,
we performed an additional slope analysis (not
Table 1 Location of Japanese co-ethnic cores
City Province Year in which core status was attained
Beijing Beijing* 1996
Dalian (2 cores) Liaoning 1996 (second core: 2003)
Shanghai Shanghai* 1996
Shenzhen (2 cores) Guangdong 1996 (second core: 1996)
Suzhou (2 cores) Jiangsu 2001 (second core: 2012)
Tianjin (2 cores) Tianjin* 2003 (second core: 2004)
Hangzhou Zhejiang 2004
Qingdao Shandong 2004
Guangzhou (2 cores) Guangdong 2006 (second core: 2006)
Wuxi Jiangsu 2006
Changzhou Jiangsu 2009
Notes: * Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are municipalities with province-level status.
 Beginning of sample period.
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reported) based on the predicted probability of
establishing second subsidiaries in cores (e.g.,
Blevins, Moschieri, Pinkham, & Ragozzino, 2016).
When an MNE established a second subsidiary in
1996, the predicted probability of that subsidiary
being in a co-ethnic core was 0.45 for MNEs with a
first subsidiary in a core, versus 0.26 for MNEs with
a first subsidiary in the periphery. This is a differ-
ence in probability of about 0.20 (p\0.01). For
second subsidiaries established in later years, that
gap shrinks over time and diminishes by the end of
the sample period. While the analysis suggests that
this gap is shrinking, the data are right-censored,
meaning that the second subsidiary investments
are yet to be observed for many MNEs in this later
period. For this reason, we interpreted the slopes
only, and not the difference in slopes between 1996
and 2012. The average marginal effect of a sub-
sidiary 1 core was 0.08 (p\0.05), suggesting that
the probability of the second subsidiary being in a
core was, on average, about eight percentage points
higher if the first subsidiary was in a core.8
Our second hypothesis proposed that first entry
through a core location accelerates subsequent
expansion in the host country. We predicted the
formation of MNEs’ second, third, and fourth
subsidiaries using the WLW model (Wei et al.,
1989). Table 4 reports the results. Building on
Table 3 Logistic regression results for location of second subsidiaries: Hypothesis 1
Model Model 1 Model 2
Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Subsidiary 1 core – – 3.51* 1.71
Subsidiary 1 start year 0.97 0.03 0.96 0.02
Subsidiary 2 start year 1.06* 0.03 1.08** 0.03
Subsidiary 1 core 9 subsidiary 2 start year – – 0.93 0.04
Subsidiary 1 Shanghai 0.22*** 0.05 0.18*** 0.05
Marketization province 1 1.10 0.09 1.09 0.09
Parent industry (base: manufacturing)
Retail 1.22 0.89 1.25 0.91
Wholesale 1.10 0.31 1.07 0.31
Service 0.66 0.27 0.65 0.27
Subsidiary industry (base: manufacturing)
Retail 6.57* 4.81 6.24* 4.52
Wholesale 10.79*** 2.60 10.58*** 2.55
Service 8.26*** 3.18 7.72*** 2.99
Controls for subsidiary investment purpose
Resource seeking 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.32
Labor seeking 0.63 0.21 0.60 0.20
Government incentives 1.28 0.72 1.41 0.79
Int’l production network 0.45** 0.12 0.44** 0.11
Int’l distribution network 1.97* 0.57 2.02* 0.59
Local market expansion 1.17 0.26 1.18 0.27
Export to third country 0.94 0.55 0.88 0.51
Reverse imports to Japan 0.82 0.35 0.88 0.37
Following customers, suppliers, related firms 0.74 0.28 0.78 0.30
Currency & financial risk management 1.93 2.08 2.12 2.29
Information & knowledge seeking 1.43 0.52 1.46 0.54
R&D 0.96 0.42 0.92 0.40
Expansion into new business 1.08 0.53 1.04 0.50
Regional headquarters 1.96 2.07 2.26 2.42
MNE size 1.68 1.16 1.52 1.07
International experience 1.17 1.34 1.20 1.38
Constant 0.19* 0.13 0.16** 0.11
Log likelihood -466.80 -463.23
N 972a 972a
Notes: The base outcome is the location of subsidiary 2 in the periphery.
 p\0.10, * p\0.05, ** p\0.01, *** p\0.001.
a Out of the analytical sample of 2,536 MNEs, 972 MNEs established two or more subsidiaries in China.
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Model 1, Model 2 introduces the covariate sub-
sidiary 1 core and an interaction term with time.
Because the WLW model is a type of stratified Cox
model, both the duration variable (which measures
time to subsidiary formation) and the stratification
variable (which distinguishes subsidiaries 2–4) are
implicit and thus do not produce coefficient esti-
mates (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001). As with a
simple Cox proportional hazard model, hazard
ratios greater than 1 indicate that a covariate has
an accelerating effect on the event(s) of interest, as
it increases the hazard of the event’s occurrence
(Allison, 2014; Singer & Willett, 2003). By contrast,
a hazard ratio between 0 and 1 indicates a decel-
erating effect, as the baseline hazard is multiplied
by a factor of less than 1 (Allison, 2014; Singer &
Willett, 2003). Because the model predicts three
slightly different types of events (the formation of
second, third, and fourth subsidiaries), the hazard
ratio represents the average effect of the covariate
on these three types of events (Box-Steffensmeier &
Zorn, 2001; Ezell et al., 2003). The hazard ratio
associated with subsidiary 1 core is greater than 1,
indicating that initial entry into a core location is
associated with significantly faster subsequent
expansion in the host country (p\0.01). As with
Hypothesis 1, the main effect is interpreted as the
effect in the year 1996, when the interacting
variable subsidiary 1 start year takes a value of zero.
Thus a first subsidiary established in 1996 in a core
increased the hazard of subsequent expansion by
approximately 47% (hazard ratio: 1.47, p\0.01),
compared to a first subsidiary established in the
periphery. Hence Hypothesis 2 is supported. How-
ever, the hazard ratio of 0.94 (p\0.01) associated
with the interaction term suggests that the accel-
erating effect of an initial core entry is not
stable over time (Buis, 2010). The accelerating
effect seems to be largest for MNEs entering China
at the beginning of the sample period in 1996. For
MNEs entering China later, the accelerating effect
of the initial core entry on subsequent subsidiary
formation weakens (by approximately 6%) for each
year after 1996.
With respect to our control variables, a notewor-
thy finding was that first subsidiaries within the
administrative boundaries of Shanghai are associ-
ated with significantly different expansion pat-
terns, compared to the rest of China. Specifically,
subsequent subsidiaries are much less likely to be
located in a core, and the hazard of expansion is
significantly lower than for MNEs whose first
subsidiary was not in Shanghai. We examined this
phenomenon with supplementary analyses, which
we discuss in the robustness analyses section below.
Robustness Analyses
We examined to what extent our analyses using
geo-visualization-based cores and peripheries led to
different empirical conclusions than equivalent
analyses using administrative boundaries to iden-
tify cores and peripheries. For this comparison, we
again used prefecture-level cities as administrative
units and ranked them by city-level FDI inflows.
Table 4 Repeated-hazards event history analysis of within-country expansion (subsidiaries 2–4): Hypothesis 2
Model Model 1 Model 2
Hazard ratio Std. error Hazard ratio Std. error
Subsidiary 1 core – – 1.47** 0.22
Subsidiary 1 start year 0.99 0.01 1.00 0.01
Sub 1 core 9 sub 1 start year – – 0.94** 0.02
Subsidiary 1 Shanghai 0.74** 0.07 0.77** 0.08
Marketization province 1 1.03 0.04 1.02 0.04
Parent industry (base: manufacturing)
Retail 1.74* 0.44 1.82* 0.46
Wholesale 1.14 0.13 1.13 0.14
Service 1.02 0.13 1.03 0.13
MNE size 1.73*** 0.13 1.73*** 0.13
International experience 0.86* 0.06 0.86* 0.06
Log pseudo-likelihood -9,555.40 -9,547.13
N 2,536 2,536
Note: The model predicts the hazard of expansion (creation of subsidiaries 2–4). Hazard ratios greater than 1 indicate an accelerating effect, while
hazard ratios below 1 indicate a delaying effect. The Wei–Lin–Weissfeld model is a repeated-hazards Cox model, stratified by subsidiary sequence
number, with subsidiaries clustered by MNE. The Efron method was used to resolve ties.
* p\0.05, ** p\0.01, *** p\0.001.
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We identified several different sets of ‘‘city cores,’’
using either Japanese FDI or FDI from all source
countries, and experimenting with different cut-off
values (e.g., Top 3, Top 5, and Top 10 FDI-attracting
cities). We then re-ran our models with these city-
cores instead of the geo-visualization-based cores.
In contrast to the geo-visualization-based models
reported above, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not
supported in any of the models with cores defined
by administrative units.
We further investigated the incremental effect of
the geo-visualization-based cores over cores defined
by city boundaries. For this purpose, we re-ran our
model for Hypothesis 2 on a subsample including
only MNEs that entered China through one of the
Top 5 FDI-attracting cities. Any significant effect of
our geo-visualization-based cores within this sub-
sample would indicate that even within these
cities, which are highly attractive to foreign firms,
it makes a measurable difference whether the initial
subsidiary was located inside or outside of the co-
ethnic core. We found that this is indeed the case: a
first subsidiary in the co-ethnic core, compared to
other locations within a Top 5 city, increases the
hazard of expansion by over 60% (hazard ratio
1.64, p\0.01).
Given that the control variable for Shanghai
indicated significant differences between Shanghai
and other locations, we also tested whether the
effect of initial subsidiary location (core or periph-
ery) differed between Shanghai and other locations.
However, the interaction between Shanghai and
subsidiary 1 core did not significantly improve
model fit in the models for either hypothesis
(p[0.10). Hence we concluded that the core/
periphery effect does not differ systematically
between Shanghai and the rest of the country.
Finally, we expected the knowledge intensity of
MNEs to affect their location preferences, because
core and periphery locations are thought to differ
in their resource endowments (Cantwell &
Mudambi, 2011; Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016;
Santangelo, 2009). Specifically, core locations tend
to offer better access to diverse and sophisticated
knowledge resources than non-core locations,
which might make them more attractive for knowl-
edge-intensive firms (Mudambi, 2008). By contrast,
periphery locations may offer cost advantages for
less knowledge-intensive activities (Mudambi &
Santangelo, 2016). Although data limitations pre-
cluded us from incorporating R&D intensity in our
main model, we analyzed a subsample of publicly
listed firms for which R&D data was available.
Although R&D intensity appeared to be positively
correlated with the first and second subsidiary
locations in the core, coefficients were not signif-
icant (p[0.10) once all control variables were
included.
DISCUSSION
We find support for the argument that an initial
entry in a co-ethnic core is associated with subse-
quent core investment and accelerated subsidiary
formation. This has important implications for
theory and practice. Our findings suggest that the
initial subnational entry location of an MNE can
have long-term consequences for the MNE’s subse-
quent development in a specific host country. On
the one hand, co-ethnic cores facilitate expansion-
location identification, particularly other co-ethnic
cores, and thus might be effective means for
mitigating liabilities of foreignness and outsider-
ship (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009) and difficulties
associated with operating in environments with
otherwise weak formal market-supporting institu-
tions (Hernandez, 2014; Miller et al., 2008; Tan &
Meyer, 2011). On the other hand, the tendency of
MNEs to remain in co-ethnic cores may also reflect
the constraining effect of co-ethnic communities
(Kim, 2015; Laursen, Masciarelli, & Prencipe, 2012).
MNEs that enter the host market through co-ethnic
cores may fail to develop the requisite local knowl-
edge for expanding beyond co-ethnic cores.9 This
type of entrenchment could prevent MNEs from
exploiting opportunities and recourses located in
periphery locations (Manning et al., 2012;
Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016). To look more
deeply into this nuance of the models, we also
considered the financial performance associated
with core-to-core expansion strategies, both in
terms of revenue growth and subsidiary survival.
We did not find a strong performance connection
with core-to-core expansion strategies, relative to
other expansion strategies (not reported). This is
consistent with conversations in the literature and
offers a key takeaway for managers – entry in a co-
ethnic core does not appear to positively influence
survival or performance and may lead to entrench-
ment that makes it difficult to expand beyond
cores. However, we believe that further research
investigating the performance outcomes of core
entry and expansion strategies is warranted.
Our motivation for this study was to push theory
development by offering an alternative to how we
treat FDI data in IB research in general and at the
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subnational host-country level in particular. For
instance, institution-based scholars have high-
lighted the attractiveness of (subnational) admin-
istrative regions with strong market-supporting
institutions. However, these studies aggregate FDI
data within administrative units, such as provinces
or states, for which institutional data is available
(e.g., Chan et al., 2010; Li & Park, 2006; Ma, Tong,
& Fitza, 2013; Schotter & Beamish, 2011; Shi et al.,
2014). Notably, more recent work in the global
cities literature pushes the boundaries of these
aggregate measures of FDI (Goerzen et al., 2013;
Blevins et al., 2016). We have taken the next step by
‘‘zooming in’’ further than even the relatively fine-
grained prefecture-city level. We show that the
precise location within such administrative units
matters. For instance, among the subset of MNEs
that entered China through one of the Top 5 FDI-
receiving cities, we found significant differences in
expansion speed between MNEs that entered
through the co-ethnic cores of these cities, and
MNEs that entered through a Top 5 city but outside
of the co-ethnic cores. This supports the notion of
co-ethnic cores as spatially limited areas – or
enclaves – within major cities (Kim, 2003; Wang
& Lau, 2008; Zhang, 2008), within which social
relationships between co-ethnic firms enable
bazaar-type exchanges (Dana et al., 2008). We
illustrate the spatial limits of these co-ethnic cores,
using Beijing as an example (Figure 2) – the co-
ethnic core is mostly contained within the 4th Ring
Road in the city center, and large parts of the city
are classified as periphery.
Further, our empirical analysis, which controls
for province-level formal institutions, suggests that
location in a co-ethnic core has effects above and
beyond those of formal institutions. It is possible
that past studies using administrative boundaries
have conflated the effects of institutions and co-
ethnic agglomerations, because in practice agglom-
erations tend to occur in institutionally more
developed subnational regions. Our study repre-
sents an improvement in the delineation between
the effects of co-ethnic agglomeration from insti-
tutional effects.
Finally, we respond to calls for better integration
of geospatial analysis in FDI research and the
utilization of organic definitions of geographic
space (Alca´cer & Zhao, 2016). To this end, we
enrich this emerging field of subnational analysis
by operationalizing and empirically testing the
relationships among organically estimated cores.
Using KDE allowed us to leverage deterministic
interpolation and smoothing techniques to create
well-defined spaces. KDE measures cell densities in
a grid of points by using a sample of known points.
This contrasts with the method described in Alca´cer
and Zhao (2016), because KDE does not show
clusters based on volume alone. Instead, the
method generates predicted values for specified
spatial locations using a limited number of sample
data points at nearby locations. This provides an
avenue for leveraging smaller-N samples that may
otherwise go unnoticed. The KDE method may also
be preferable over clustering analysis alone because
FDI datasets (a) are often finite, (b) are not
uniformly distributed among smaller area units,
and (c) have unevenly distributed activities (Krug-
man, 1991; Overman, Redding, & Venables, 2001;
Venables, 1995, 2006). While sample sizes in
metropolitan areas are much larger, clustering does
not account for restrictions set by provinces and
other subnational locations where volume is low
and dispersed. To overcome this issue, we follow
the GIS literature and treat these data collectively
through interpolation before using them in geo-
graphic analyses of relationships between busi-
nesses or concentrations of economic activity
(Meng, Law, & Thompson, 2010).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our research is subject to some limitations. First,
the starting point for our analysis was that the
subnational location decisions of Japanese MNEs
involved existing co-ethnic cores and peripheries at
the time of investment. Thus we did not incorpo-
rate a discussion of the emergence of these initial
cores. However, geo-visualization showed that co-
ethnic cores tended to emerge in regions that
attracted large amounts of FDI overall, rather than
just co-ethnic FDI. This provides two potential
pathways for future research. First, there is an
opportunity to explore the underlying mechanism
for initial co-ethnic core formation that is different
from other agglomeration drivers and to test
whether there are geographic and temporal limits
to the establishment of new cores. What remains
potentially unobserved are the pressures that drive
co-ethnic MNEs to ‘‘circle up the wagons’’ in order
to carve out a geographic space to sustain and
support other co-ethnic MNEs. The second path-
way is to look more closely at the patterns of
periphery-based expansion. Whereas the core–pe-
riphery literature predicts a dispersion of actors in
the periphery as a result of limited resources and
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resource lock-up by early entrants (Mudambi &
Santangelo, 2016), our geo-visualization analysis
generated some evidence that co-ethnic MNEs also
tend to collocate in the periphery. We suggest that
a series of empirical studies may lead to a predictive
theory of co-ethnic core formation in periphery
locations.
Second, the dichotomous structure of the core–
periphery framework may obscure more nuanced
subnational differences. Our analysis assumes that a
location becomes a co-ethnic core once a threshold
density of co-ethnic FDI activity has been reached.
This leaves open the possibility of a hierarchy of
cores, where cores with very high densities of co-
ethnic firms have different effects on MNEs than
cores that barely exceed density threshold levels.
These locations may have hybrid characteristics
that differ from both core and periphery locations,
which may have implications for MNE location and
expansion decisions. Therefore we explored some of
these possibilities in a number of supplementary
sensitivity analyses (not reported). We used alter-
native cut-off values for co-ethnic agglomerations,
introduced an intermediate category of ‘‘secondary
core,’’ and distinguished between specific cores (e.g.,
Shanghai core versus Beijing–Tianjin core versus
Shenzhen core, etc.). However, most of these mod-
ifications did not result in meaningful improve-
ments to our model in the context of the theory
development objectives of this study. Future
research could explore the effects of layered core–
periphery boundaries. Similarly, there may be
important differences among periphery locations –
for instance, between those in coastal provinces and
those in the remote interior. Future research could
refine our idea of co-ethnic cores and peripheries by
examining their composition more closely. In par-
ticular, a focus on boundaries, hierarchies, and
collocating consistency over time may be fruitful.
Third, using an exclusively Japanese sample
might have limited our analysis. Although studying
investment from a single country of origin allowed
us to control for several home-country effects, this
might have reduced our ability to extend these
effects to FDI more broadly. Specifically, Japanese
firms may differ from MNEs from other countries in
how they are influenced by home-country embed-
dedness (Ahmadjian, 2016). For instance, the
embeddedness and co-ethnic literatures maintain
that Japanese firms tend to have very high ethnic
cohesion in geographic clusters (Head et al., 1995;
Hernandez, 2014; Waldinger, 1995). Although our
literature review showed that the phenomenon of
co-ethnic co-location is by no means unique to
Japanese firms, the strength of co-ethnic commu-
nity effects, and their specific manifestation in
strategic choices of firms, may differ between firms
from different home countries. Thus future
research should establish the boundary conditions
of our findings by replicating our study in different
home- and host-country settings.
Fourth, the focus on China as the research setting
(despite the advantages outlined above) also has
some drawbacks. Most notably, the location
choices of MNEs in certain industries were at times
restricted by government regulation (primarily
during the very early part of our sample period).
We sought to control for this by introducing
measures for the timing of initial and subsequent
investments. Future studies could address these
limitations by using data from multiple home and
host countries and by structuring the data around
advanced time-sensitive modeling.
Finally, we view the core–periphery framework
and the notion of co-ethnic agglomerations as
complementary to other existing perspectives on
FDI and subnational diversity. For instance, we
fully acknowledge the importance of institutional
frameworks (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009;
Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008) at the national and
subnational levels for explaining FDI flows. We
control for formal market-supporting institutions
at the provincial level using the marketization
index (Wang et al., 2007), which is a typical
measure of institutional development employed
in extant China research (Shi et al., 2014). How-
ever, we believe that more work needs to be done in
this space, because available measures of institu-
tional development have very limited accounts of
informal institutional differences. Whereas some
formal institutions (such as provincial regulations
and city bylaws) may be reflected by subnational
administrative boundaries, informal institutions
such as acceptance of foreign MNEs (Schotter &
Beamish, 2011) might more closely map onto the
core–periphery landscape, which transcends
administrative boundaries. Projects that triangulate
field research with archival sources for elaborating
our findings related to informal institutions and co-
ethnicity in particular are warranted. Overall, we
suggest that there is a need to further integrate the
core–periphery framework and the effects of co-
ethnic agglomerations discussed in our study with a
broader institutional perspective.
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CONCLUSION
This study contributes to the understanding of
subnational core and periphery locations and their
relation to the expansion patterns of foreign MNEs.
First, we add to theory by showing how the
informal mechanism of co-ethnic agglomerations
may facilitate the expansion of co-ethnic MNEs
within China. We also add to the emerging subna-
tional application of the core–periphery framework
(Mudambi & Santangelo, 2016; Santangelo, 2009)
by uncovering a specific mechanism, available in a
subset of cores, that allows co-ethnic MNEs to
bridge markets that are inefficient or in transition.
In addition, we focus on co-ethnic FDI – i.e.,
investment from a specific country of origin and the
agglomeration of MNEs from that country of origin.
Geocoded FDI activities guided our determination
of whether Japanese MNEs are able to tap into co-
ethnic community resources, which allowed us to
provide a better understanding of subnational
heterogeneity. We thus introduce a more nuanced
approach to the treatment of foreign investment
locations and MNE agglomeration (Meyer et al.,
2011; McCann & Mudambi, 2005). We show that
an MNE’s initial subnational location matters, by
demonstrating that the initial location creates a
path dependency for the MNE’s subsequent within-
country expansion. Finally, through geo-visualiza-
tion we bring new methodological techniques from
adjacent research domains to IB for identifying
previously overlooked heterogeneity in FDI flows.
This provides alternative paths for IB research to
deepen our understanding of subnational FDI pat-
terns, as well as their antecedents and effects.
Our research has several important implications
for MNE executives concerned with foreign market
entry and expansion decisions. First, for executives
it is critical to understand that entry in a co-ethnic
core can create path dependencies with respect to
subsequent investments in the host country. Co-
ethnic cores are attractive locations for initial entry
because the co-ethnic community can provide
resources and information, which tends to accel-
erate within-country expansion and facilitate
expansion to other co-ethnic cores in the same
country. However, dependence on co-ethnic sup-
port and the tendency to expand to other core
locations may prevent MNEs from realizing oppor-
tunities in periphery locations (Mudambi & San-
tangelo, 2016). Second, our research suggests that
executives should pay close attention to the actual
geographic proximity of potential investment sites
to other co-ethnic MNEs, because the benefits of
co-ethnic communities are sensitive to geographic
distance. Therefore even within city-level bound-
aries, the choice of neighborhood matters.
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NOTES
1There is also a well-established economic geogra-
phy literature on MNE clusters and connectivity (see
Lorenzen & Mudambi, 2013) that emphasizes the
importance of local geography.
2When firms (and individuals) from the same home
country interact in close geographic proximity, they
may form co-ethnic communities characterized by
ongoing social relationships, trust based on home-
country social norms, and support infrastructure such
as home-country banks, schools, and social services.
Because many of the nuances of co-ethnic communi-
ties are difficult to observe, we focus on the observable
outcome of co-ethnic FDI activity that is tightly
coupled with the observed presence of co-ethnic
communities in the literature: co-ethnic agglomeration.
Below, we further introduce the term co-ethnic cores to
refer to locations with particularly dense co-ethnic
agglomerations, in which the co-ethnic community
should be particularly strong.
3It is also conceivable that entry into the periphery
accelerates MNE expansion in some cases. The reason
is that periphery locations may not be able to meet all
the resource requirements of the entering MNE. Thus
the MNE may need to establish additional subsidiaries
in order to pool resources across subnational locations,
which could result in an accelerated expansion rate.
We regard this phenomenon as the exception.
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4The so-called ‘‘prefecture-level cities’’ are the main
sub-provincial administrative unit in China. Notably,
prefecture-level cities consist not just of a single urban
area, but usually include several counties, lower-tier
cities, and rural areas (Lin & Zhang, 2015).
5Our geo-visualization is much more interactive than
comparable maps produced with R packages such as
Leaflet (Graul, 2016) or RgoogleMaps (Loecher &
Ropkins, 2015). Interactions on maps produced with R
packages generally only allow users to zoom in and
out and probe specific locations, without integrating
other research methods. Our approach, in addition to
the numerous analytical tools embedded in the geo-
visualization, allowed us to select groups of sub-
sidiaries on the map (e.g., subsidiaries in cores) and




7Note that subsidiary 3 start year and subsidiary 4
start year were included for completeness in the
correlation matrix. Even though these variables were
not explicitly entered into our models, they underpin
the repeated-hazards model used to test Hypothesis 2.
8Although the focus of this article was specifically on
MNE expansion to new subnational locations within
the host country, we also conducted a number of
supplementary analyses in order to better understand
the difference between expansion to new locations
and expansion in an existing location (e.g., the
formation of multiple subsidiaries in the same city).
While our data source is somewhat limited with
respect to some of the critical organizational ante-
cedents of same-location vs. different-location invest-
ment decisions, our exploratory analyses led to the
following observations: the type of initial location
(core vs. periphery) is not a significant predictor of
repeat investment (p[0.10), nor is the time gap
between two subsidiaries (p[0.10). However, the
odds of the first two subsidiaries being established in
the same city are higher when both subsidiaries are in
the same industry, when the second subsidiary is in
the retail or wholesale industry, or when the second
subsidiary is intended to enter a new line of business.
By contrast, the odds of the first two subsidiaries being
co-located are lower when the MNE is in the wholesale
business, or when the second investment was made to
follow customers or partner firms.
9We thank the anonymous reviewer for this insight
concerning secondary core and proximity alternatives.
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APPENDIX
We conducted an exploratory analysis of the
expansion paths of MNEs. Using the complete
sample of MNEs with at least two subsidiaries in
China (before case-wise deletion and exclusion of
repeat investments in the same prefecture-level
city), we collated the locations of each MNE’s first,
second, and third subsidiaries in a Sankey diagram
(Figure A1). To improve the readability of the
Sankey diagram, we grouped cores and peripheries
by regions (see Table A1). Our regions were adapted
from the ‘‘macro-regions’’ commonly used by
China scholars (Naughton, 2007). The diagram
reveals a very dynamic range of expansion patterns
between cores and from the periphery to different
cores.
The Sankey diagram shows the locations of MNEs’
first, second, and third subsidiaries. Firms with only
one entry are not shown. The diagram is based on
data from all MNEs with at least two subsidiaries in
China (N = 1,799), not the more restricted analyt-
ical sample used for hypothesis testing. Notably, our
analytical sample excludes repeat investments in a
single location. Cores and peripheries are grouped
into regions for improved readability (see Table A1).
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